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On March 15, 2013 Dalhousie students pursuing their J.D., LL.M., or J.S.D. were invit-
ed to present papers at the Schulich School of Law’s inaugural Think Tank Student 
Legal Research Conference. Selected students presented a condensed version of their 
research on a legal topic of interest. Presenters were paired with faculty members who 
provided feedback after their presentations.  
 
The student with the top presentation, as selected by the Dalhousie Journal of Legal 
Studies Editorial Board, received a cash prize of $250 and the opportunity to publish 
his research in Volume 22 of the Journal. This year’s prize recipient was  
Hunter Parsons, who won for his article “Jagged Little Pill: The New Frontier for 
Shareholder Rights Plans and the Fiduciary Duties of Target Boards.”  
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JAGGED LITTLE PILL: THE NEW FRONTIER FOR SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
PLANS AND THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF TARGET BOARDS 
Hunter Parsons* 
A. Introduction 
In Oliver Stone’s 1987 drama, Wall Street, Gordon Gekko, played by Michael 
Douglas, declares that the market for corporate control is “a zero sum game—
somebody wins, somebody loses. Money itself isn’t lost or made, it’s simply trans-
ferred from one perception to another.” In Canada, the provincial securities 
regulators play an important role in determining the winners and losers in the “ze-
ro sum game” of hostile takeover bids through the regulation of defensive tactics.1 
The decision of a target board of directors to take defensive action in the face of a 
hostile bid by deploying a shareholder rights plan (or “poison pill”) is the frontier 
where corporate law meets securities regulation. 
A poison pill works by making a corporate takeover prohibitively expensive.2 
The typical poison pill gives the shareholders of the corporation the right to pur-
chase additional shares of the corporation at a price well below market value upon 
the occurrence of a triggering event. In the event that an acquiror obtains a speci-
fied percentage of a class of shares in the target corporation, the right to purchase is 
triggered. The terms of the poison pill will exclude the acquiror from participating 
in the exercise of the rights plan. If the poison pill is triggered, then the acquiror 
faces the prospect of having to buy enough of the newly issued shares to achieve a 
majority interest in the corporation. 
Two recent securities commission decisions have blurred the line between cor-
porate law and securities regulation by venturing into an analysis of the fiduciary 
                                                                                                                                                         
* Hunter Parsons holds a J.D. from the Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University. He is currently 
articling at Borden Ladner Gervais in Vancouver, BC. He would like to thank Professor Sarah Bradley 
for her helpful comments and valuable assistance in writing this paper. 
 
1 Takeover Bids – Defensive Tactics, OSC NP 62-202 (4 July 1997) [NP 62-202]; Christopher C Nicholls, 
Mergers, Acquisitions and Other Changes of Corporate Control, 2d ed (Toronto, Ontario: Irwin Law, 
2012) at 196 (when one corporation decides that it wants to acquire control of another corporation 
against the wishes of the target corporation’s board and management, this is referred to as a “hostile” 
takeover). 
2 See Ronald Podolny, “Fixing What Ain’t Broke: In Defence of Canadian Poison Pill Regulation” (2009) 
67(1) UT Fac L Rev 47 (QL). 
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duties of target boards in the context of poison pill regulation.3 This has increased 
the tension between corporate law and securities regulation, but has also highlight-
ed the divergent approaches to poison pill regulation amongst three of the largest 
provincial securities commissions: the Ontario Securities Commission (the 
“OSC”), the Alberta Securities Commission (the “ASC”), and the British Columbia 
Securities Commission (the “BCSC”). At corporate law, the directors’ fiduciary 
duties do not change in the context of a hostile takeover bid: the target board is 
required to act in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation.4 Reviewing 
courts will typically afford deference to the business judgment of the target board 
in the face of a hostile bid. The business judgment rule provides that the directors 
of a corporation are not required to make perfect decisions. So long as the direc-
tors’ course of action is reasonable, then reviewing courts will apply a deferential 
approach to their decision.5 In contrast, securities regulation utilizes an interven-
tionist approach in the context of a hostile bid so as to ensure that shareholders are 
not denied their right to choose whether to tender to the bid.6 This raises the dis-
tinct possibility of a target board deploying a poison pill in accordance with its 
fiduciary duty that may be found to be in violation of the corporation’s obligations 
under securities regulation.  
In response to the current tumult in poison pill regulation, the Canadian Secu-
rities Administrators (the “CSA”) released Proposed National Instrument 62-105 
(the “Proposed Policy”) on March 14, 2013. The Proposed Policy purports to fun-
damentally change the regulatory approach for poison pills. Under the existing 
regulatory framework, articulated in National Policy 62-202 (“NP 62-202”), the 
provincial securities regulators have, for the most part, treated poison pills as a 
temporary defensive tactic. After a series of conflicting decisions from the ASC, 
OSC, and BCSC on the utility of poison pills in the context of a hostile takeover 
bid, the Proposed Policy is an attempt to remove this defensive tactic from the pur-
view of ad hoc regulatory review. The Proposed Policy, if adopted, will allow a 
target board to completely block a hostile takeover bid through a poison pill so 
long as it receives shareholder ratification within 90 days of its adoption and annu-
ally thereafter.7 
This paper will consider the merits of the existing regulatory framework, NP 
62-202, and the anticipated benefits of the Proposed Policy. The author will analyze 
a recent line of securities commission decisions that have blurred the distinction 
between the fiduciary duty analysis under corporate law and the public interest 
powers to cease trade a poison pill under securities regulation. The prevailing ap-
proach in the securities regulation context will be canvassed and compared with 
the current corporate law concerning the fiduciary duties of target boards in the 
face of a hostile bid. This paper will detail the ways in which these approaches con-
                                                                                                                                                         
3 Neo Material Technologies Inc (Re), 2009 LNONOSC 638 [Re Neo]; Pulse Data Inc (Re), 2007 ABASC 
895 [Re Pulse Data]. 
4 BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69 at para 44 [BCE]. 
5 Pente Investment Management Ltd v Schneider Corp, [1998] OJ No 4142 at para 34 (ONCA) [Pente 
Investment Management]. 
6 NP 62-202, supra note 1, s 1.1(5). 
7 Proposed National Instrument 62-105 Security Holder Rights Plans, CSA Notice and Request for Com-
ment, 36 OSCB 2643 at 2663 (2013) [Proposed Policy].  
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flict and create inconsistent results. Finally, the author will consider this problem 
in light of the Proposed Policy, and will offer some thoughts concerning the inter-
section of directors’ obligations under the proposed regulatory framework and 
their fiduciary duty under corporate law.  
The author argues that the Proposed Policy will reduce the current uncertainty 
in securities law since poison pills will essentially be self-regulating. However, the 
Proposed Policy does nothing to resolve the conflict between securities and corpo-
rate law. The directors’ statutory power and discretion to manage the corporation 
will be impaired so long as securities commissions continue to regulate poison pills 
and other defensive tactics. The Proposed Policy indicates this will continue to be 
the case. Therefore, in the face of a hostile bid, the interests of the shareholders will 
prevail over the interests of the other stakeholders in the corporation. This is a 
dramatic departure from the approach endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in two recent decisions on directors’ fiduciary duties. The Proposed Policy will 
fundamentally alter corporate decision-making in boardrooms across the country.  
B. The Current Regulatory Framework for Poison Pills 
Pursuant to Ontario’s Securities Act (the “OSA”), an “interested person” may 
bring an application to the commission to cease trade a poison pill.8 The definition 
of “interested person” includes an offeror, which captures all hostile bidders who 
are faced with a target board that has implemented a poison pill.9 After hearing the 
application, the commission may make an order “directing the directors […] to 
comply with or to cease contravening a requirement under […] the regulations 
related to this part.”10 The combination of the definition of “regulations” and 
“rules” in the OSA gives authority to the national policy that provides the frame-
work for poison pill regulation: NP 62-202.11 
NP 62-202 recognizes that directors of a target corporation may take certain 
“defensive measures” in an effort to defeat an unsolicited bid.12 However, the policy 
states that the primary objective of the takeover bid provisions in securities legisla-
tion is to protect the “bona fide interests of the shareholders of a target company.”13 
This policy is aimed at defensive tactics deployed by a target board that have the 
effect of denying shareholders the ability to decide whether to tender their shares 
into the bid.14 NP 62-202 specifically identifies poison pills as “defensive tactics that 
may come under scrutiny” when used in the face of a hostile bid.15 The policy cau-
tions that regulators will “take appropriate action if they become aware of defensive 
                                                                                                                                                         
8 Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S 5, s 104(1) [OSA]. For the purposes of this paper, the Ontario securities 
legislation, regulations and rules will be used. 
9 Ibid, s 103(b) and (c).  
10 Ibid, s 104(1)(e). 
11 Ibid, s 1(1) “regulations” and “rules.” 
12 NP 62-202, supra note 1, s 1.1(1). 
13 Ibid, s 1.1(2). 
14 Ibid, s 1.1(5). 
15 Ibid, s 1.1(4)(a). 
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tactics that will likely result in shareholders being deprived of the ability to respond 
to the take-over bid.”16 
Until recently, NP 62-202 and the corresponding body of regulatory decisions 
were clear that a target board could not use a poison pill to completely block a hos-
tile takeover bid.17 According to securities regulators, target boards could only use a 
poison pill as a temporary defensive tactic in order to generate a more favourable 
offer for the shareholders of the target corporation.18 However, a 2007 decision 
from the ASC and a 2009 decision from the OSC ended almost twenty years of sta-
bility and certainty in poison pill regulation. In Re Pulse Data19 and Re Neo,20 the 
respective commissions held that, in certain circumstances, it is permissible for a 
poison pill to remain in place indefinitely under NP 62-202. A subsequent case 
from the BCSC, Re Lions Gate,21 signaled a return to the traditional poison pill 
analysis. However, in a 2010 case, Re Baffinland,22 the OSC took the middle ground 
by confirming the temporary nature of poison pills, but declined to expressly reject 
the approach utilized by the hearing panel in Re Neo. This has left securities regula-
tion and the market for corporate control in a state of flux, with disagreement 
among the most active provincial securities commissions as to the appropriate ap-
proach to poison pill regulation. 
C. The Intersection of Corporate Law and Securities Regulation: Poison Pills 
The regulation of unsolicited takeover bids involving corporations that are “re-
porting issuers” under the OSA falls squarely within the public interest jurisdiction 
of provincial securities commissions.23 However, NP 62-202 necessarily involves 
issues of corporate governance, which is arguably beyond the narrow jurisdiction 
of securities commissions. Under corporate law, so long as directors act in good 
faith and in the best interests of the corporation, the target board can use defensive 
tactics, such as poison pills to, in effect, “just say no” to an unsolicited takeover 
bid.24 However, NP 62-202 exhibits a clear preference for shareholder choice, re-
gardless of whether the unsolicited bid is in the best interests of the corporation.25 
Therefore, on the same set of facts, securities regulators could order the recession 
of a poison pill for violating the shareholder choice principle, while the directors, 
under existing corporate law principles, could be fulfilling their fiduciary duty to 
the corporation under the Canadian Business Corporations Act (CBCA) by using a 
poison pill to completely block a hostile bid.26 
                                                                                                                                                         
16 Ibid, s 1.1(5). 
17 Canadian Jorex Ltd (Re) (1992), 15 OSCB 257 at 263 and 264 [Re Canadian Jorex]; NP 62-202, supra 
note 1, s 1.1(5). 
18 Re Canadian Jorex, supra note 17 at 263. 
19 Re Pulse Data, supra note 3. 
20 Re Neo, supra note 3. 
21 Lions Gate Entertainment Corp (Re), 2010 BCSECCOM 432 [Re Lions Gate]. 
22 Baffinland Iron Mines Corp (Re), 2010 LNONOSC 904 [Re Baffinland]. 
23 OSA, supra note 8, s 1(1) “reporting issuer.” 
24 Teck Corp Ltd v Millar, [1972] BCJ No 566, at para 103 (BCSC) [Teck]. 
25 NP 62-202, supra note 1, s 1.1(2). 
26 Canadian Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, ss 102 and 122(1)(a) [CBCA]; NP 62-202, 
supra note 1. 
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1.  The Early Approach to Poison Pill Regulation: The “When, Not If” Era 
Through their interpretation of NP 62-202, the provincial securities commis-
sions have taken the position that it is the target’s shareholders, not its directors, 
who should ultimately decide whether or not the company will be sold.27 Starting 
with the OSC’s 1992 decision in Re Canadian Jorex, securities commissions have 
held that poison pills will be permitted to remain in place so long as they continue 
to have utility in one of two respects: either inducing a competing bid to come for-
ward, or persuading the bidder to make a better offer.28 When one of these things 
happens, or once it becomes apparent that neither will happen, then the poison pill 
has outlived its usefulness, and the “pill has got to go.”29 
In Re Canadian Jorex, the OSC was careful to point out that they were not mak-
ing a “ruling with respect to the conduct of the Jorex board in adopting the rights 
plan.”30 For the OSC, the central issue was not whether the target board acted in 
good faith by adopting the poison pill, but whether it was in the public interest for 
the poison pill to remain in place.31 However, the OSC acknowledged that, on the 
facts of the dispute before the commission, they did not have to decide whether the 
adoption of the poison pill itself was in the best interests of the corporation.32  
Through the obiter in Re Canadian Jorex, the OSC recognized that poison pill 
hearings highlight the inherent tension between the public interest jurisdiction of 
securities regulators and corporate law principles. In the OSC’s 1998 decision, Re 
CW Shareholdings, this tension was explored further. The commission said it was 
appropriate for them to “look into the question of whether there has been a breach 
of fiduciary duties” where it is in the public interest to do so in the “particular 
case.”33 The mere fact that the aggrieved party has commenced concurrent claims 
before the securities commission and the superior court does not mean that the 
jurisdiction of the commission will be ousted.34 The OSC observed that corporate 
law and securities regulation will often intersect, especially in the context of a hos-
tile takeover bid. So long as the commission considers the issue of fiduciary duties 
from the perspective of its public interest jurisdiction, this is a permissible exercise 
of its power.  
The tension between the duties of target boards under corporate law and the 
public interest jurisdiction of securities commissions was central to the OSC’s 1994 
decision, Re Lac Minerals.35 In this decision, the OSC recognized the inherent con-
flict between the “board’s duty to manage the corporation honestly and in good 
faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation” and the shareholders’ 
right to decide whether to tender their shares to the takeover bid.36 The OSC noted 
                                                                                                                                                         
27 Robert O Hansen, “The Clash of the Rights Plan Cases: Should I Stay or Should I Go?” (10 January 
2011), online: McCarthy Tétrault January 2011, McCarthy Tétrault, at 1 <http://www.mccarthy.ca>. 
28 Re Canadian Jorex, supra note 17 at 263. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid at 262. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 CW Shareholdings Inc (Re), 21 OSCB 2910 at para 45 [Re CW Shareholdings]. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Lac Minerals Ltd (Re), 17 OSCB 4963 at para 52 [Re Lac Minerals].  
36 Ibid at para 56. 
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that, where the target board is taking action in a good faith attempt to increase 
shareholder value, then the commission will interfere with the conduct of the 
board as little as possible, particularly “when to do so might relieve them of their 
duties under corporate or fiduciary law.”37 However, the corollary is that, where the 
board is not responding to the bid by attempting to increase shareholder value, 
then the securities commission will exercise its public interest jurisdiction and 
cease trade the poison pill. 
2.  Neo and Pulse: The “Just Say No” Era 
Following Re Canadian Jorex, securities regulators allowed poison pills to tem-
porarily remain in place so long as they continued to have utility by enhancing 
shareholder value.38 After that, it was time for the pill to go. This seemingly certain 
position was whittled away in 2007 by the ASC in Re Pulse Data.39 In that case, an 
unsolicited takeover bid was made for all of the shares of Pulse Data at a small 
premium above the market price at the time. In response, Pulse Data’s board 
adopted a poison pill that was ratified at a subsequent shareholder meeting by 98% 
of the shareholders.40 Pulse Data stated that it did not plan to seek an alternative 
bid and sought to use the poison pill to defeat the bid. The ASC declined to cease 
trade the poison pill since it was reluctant to “interfere with a decision of the Pulse 
Board that has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of Pulse Shareholders, 
particularly when that decision had very recently been approved by informed 
Shareholders.”41 
In Re Pulse Data, the ASC allowed the target board to completely block the un-
solicited bid through the use of a poison pill. This runs counter to the historical 
interpretation of NP 62-202 and the Re Canadian Jorex line of cases. The ASC ap-
pears to cede to the business judgment of the Pulse Data board and affords 
deference to their decision to implement a poison pill in the face of a hostile bid.42 
This is consistent with the corporate law approach toward the use of defensive tac-
tics in the context of a hostile takeover bid, but it represents a departure from the 
traditional regulatory framework. 
In 2009, the OSC had the opportunity to consider Re Pulse Data in Re Neo.43 In 
that case, the target board had a shareholder-approved poison pill in place prior to 
the takeover bid. Pala Investments, which held 20% of the outstanding shares of 
Neo, structured a takeover bid in such a way that it would not trigger the existing 
poison pill. In response, the Neo board adopted a second poison pill in order to 
block Pala Investment’s bid. 81% of Neo’s shareholders (excluding the bidder’s 
shares) ratified the second poison pill. Neo’s board said that Pala Investment’s bid 
was attempting to deny the shareholders the benefit of the control premium 
through the structure of their bid and, after a consideration of alternatives to the 
bid, it was inappropriate for Neo to initiate an auction or negotiate with Pala In-
                                                                                                                                                         
37 Ibid at para 65. 
38 Re Canadian Jorex, supra note 17. 
39 Re Pulse Data, supra note 3. 
40 Ibid at para 69. 
41 Ibid at para 101. 
42 Pente Investment Management, supra note 5 at para 34. 
43 Re Neo, supra note 3. 
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vestments.44 The OSC declined to cease trade the rights plan and commented that, 
although the primary purpose for adopting a poison pill is typically to allow the 
target board to pursue alternative transactions, this is not “the only legitimate pur-
pose for a shareholder rights plan.”45 In doing so, the OSC allowed the Neo board 
to “just say no” to Pala Investment’s takeover bid through the use of the second 
poison pill. 
In Re Neo, the OSC commented on the intersection of the fiduciary duties of 
target boards and their obligations pursuant to NP 62-202. The OSC recognized 
that the business judgment rule has applicability in the securities regulation con-
text,46 and deferred to the business judgment of the Neo board, holding that the 
target does not have to “permit and facilitate an auction of company shares each 
and every time an offeror makes a bid.”47 In this case, the OSC declined to interfere 
with the decision to adopt the second poison pill because the decision to avoid an 
auction that was not in the best interests of the corporation was within the business 
judgment of the board, and there was no reason to suggest that it was made “in any 
manner other than in furtherance of its fiduciary obligations to the corporation.”48 
3. Baffinland and Lions Gate: The “Uncertain” Era 
Following Re Pulse Data and Re Neo, the provincial securities commissions en-
tered a period of uncertainty with regard to their approach to poison pill 
regulation. The willingness of the ASC and OSC to use a corporate law-inspired 
analysis in contested poison pill applications attracted criticism from academics 
and market participants. The OSC and BCSC responded to Re Pulse Data and Re 
Neo with decisions that attempted to restore order to poison pill regulation in Can-
ada.  
In Re Baffinland, Nunavut Iron made an unsolicited takeover bid for all of the 
outstanding common shares of Baffinland in September 2010 for a price of $0.80 
per share.49 The Baffinland board already had a poison pill in place that received 
shareholder approval in March 2009.50 Following Nunavut Iron’s takeover bid an-
nouncement, the Baffinland board entered into a support agreement with another 
party, ArcelorMittal, who agreed to make a bid for all of the outstanding shares of 
Baffinland for $1.10 per common share.51 As part of the support agreement, Baffin-
land agreed to waive the poison pill immediately prior to the expiration of the 
ArcelorMittal offer.52 In essence, the Baffinland board was using the support 
agreement and the poison pill to “just say no” to Nunavut Iron’s unsolicited bid 
and allow ArcelorMittal’s bid to go to the shareholders. Nunavut Iron brought an 
application to the OSC seeking an order to cease trade the poison pill.  
                                                                                                                                                         
44 Ibid at para 71. 
45 Ibid at para 107. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid at para 109. 
48 Ibid at para 114. 
49 Ibid at para 2. 
50 Ibid at para 8. 
51 Ibid at para 9. 
52 Ibid at para 12. 
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The OSC decided to cease trade the poison pill because it had already facilitated 
an auction, and therefore, it was no longer necessary. Having received an addition-
al offer following Nunavut Iron’s bid, the poison pill achieved its purpose, so it was 
time for the pill to go.53 The OSC commented that “it will not permit a rights plan 
to be used for the purpose only of eliminating the timing advantage available to the 
first bidder.”54 Although Nunavut Iron did not indicate that it planned on increas-
ing the price of its bid, the OSC held that, ultimately, “it is the Baffinland 
shareholders who should determine the outcome of the two competing bids for 
their shares.”55 
In Re Baffinland, the OSC took the opportunity to comment on Re Neo, and in 
particular, on whether the business judgment rule has any applicability in poison 
pill regulation.56 The OSC observed that Re Neo involved unusual facts, specifically 
that shareholder approval of the poison pill took place only two weeks before the 
hearing.57 The OSC commented that “in Neo, the Commission concluded that it 
should defer to the wishes of the shareholders as expressed by the recent share-
holder vote.”58 The panel went on to state that “in our view, Neo does not stand for 
the proposition that the Commission will defer to the business judgment of a board 
of directors in considering whether to cease trade a rights plan, or that a board of 
directors in the exercise of its fiduciary duties may ‘just say no’ to a takeover bid.”59 
Despite this assertion, the commission went on to say that a consideration of 
whether the target board is acting pursuant to its fiduciary duty is a relevant, but 
secondary, consideration in deciding whether to cease trade a poison pill.60  
The BCSC had its opportunity to comment on Re Neo and Re Pulse Data in its 
2010 decision, Re Lions Gate.61 This case involved an attempted takeover of Lions 
Gate by noted corporate-raider Carl Ichan through his corporation, Ichan Part-
ners. In March 2010, when Ichan held 18.8% of Lions Gate’s common shares, he 
made a takeover bid for up to 13 million Lions Gate shares, which would have giv-
en him 29.9% of the issued and outstanding shares of the corporation.62 In 
response, the Lions Gate board adopted a poison pill and scheduled a shareholder 
meeting to ratify it. After failed negotiations between Ichan and the Lions Gate 
directors, the target board concluded that a change of control was not in the best 
interests of the corporation at that time. They took no steps to seek an alternative 
transaction or commence an auction.63 In response, Ichan brought an application 
to the BCSC before the shareholder meeting took place. 
The BCSC cease traded the Lions Gate poison pill because it denied the share-
holders their right to choose whether to tender to the bid.64 In doing so, the 
                                                                                                                                                         
53 Ibid at para 32. 
54 Ibid at para 34. 
55 Ibid at para 55. 
56 Re Baffinland, supra note 22 at para 47. 
57 Ibid at para 48. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid at para 51. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Re Lions Gate, supra note 21. 
62 Ibid at para 16. 
63 Ibid at para 24. 
64 Ibid at para 29. 
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commission took the opportunity to comment on the intersection between the 
fiduciary duty of the target board and NP 62-202. Additionally, the BCSC consid-
ered whether the target board could “just say no” to an unsolicited bid through the 
implementation of a poison pill. 
On the fiduciary duty issue, the BCSC commented that “a target company 
board, faced with a hostile bid, has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the 
corporation, and the regulators are reluctant to interfere with actions taken by a 
target company board to discharge that duty.”65 However, they went on to say that 
securities commissions will only be reluctant to interfere where the target board is 
making efforts to maximize shareholder value, and that the target company’s 
shareholders should ultimately have the opportunity to decide whether to tender to 
the bid.66 The BCSC said that whether the target board met its fiduciary duty will 
not factor into the securities commission’s decision-making.67 Unless the board 
behaves improperly—that is, in breach of its fiduciary duty—then compliance with 
its duties under the CBCA will be a neutral factor.68 
The BCSC declined to defer to the business judgment of the Lions Gate board. 
The fact that the target board had a reasonable belief that a change of control was 
not in the best interests of the corporation was an irrelevant consideration for the 
commission. Although the directors may have met their fiduciary duty by attempt-
ing to block the bid, “the board should not expect Canadian securities regulators to 
allow a [shareholder rights plan] to interfere with the shareholders’ right to decide 
whether to tender into the bid.”69 
In this decision, the BCSC reaffirmed the “when, not if” approach under NP 62-
202: where the target board is not taking active steps to increase shareholder value 
in response to an unsolicited bid, then the poison pill will not be allowed to contin-
ue.70 The BCSC observed that the mere fact that the target shareholders approved 
the poison pill does not mean that the target can “just say no” to an unsolicited 
takeover bid. Shareholder approval may be a relevant factor, but it is not determi-
native.71 For the BCSC, “the principle that the shareholders must always have the 
opportunity to decide cannot co-exist with one that would allow target company 
boards to ‘just say no’ to bids.”72 
4.  The Current Role of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in Poison Pill Regulation 
It is evident that, since Re Pulse Data was released in 2007, the provincial secu-
rities commissions have disagreed on the extent that directors’ fiduciary duties are 
relevant in poison pill regulation. Particularly, there has been disagreement 
amongst the ASC, OSC, and BCSC as to whether the business judgment rule ap-
plies to a target board’s decision to implement a poison pill in the face of a hostile 
bid. Re Neo and Re Pulse Data reveal that the OSC and ASC are willing, in some 
                                                                                                                                                         
65 Ibid at para 50. 
66 Ibid at para 53. 
67 Ibid at para 62. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid at para 66. 
70 Ibid at para 68. 
71 Ibid at para 91. 
72 Ibid at para 84. 
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circumstances, to apply corporate law principles to the resolution of disputes in the 
securities regulation forum. These hearing panels were willing to defer to the direc-
tors’ business judgment where there was recent and informed shareholder approval 
of the poison pill. Perhaps the unique factual scenarios that gave rise to each of 
these decisions emboldened the hearing panels to depart from the separation be-
tween corporate law and securities regulation endorsed by Re CW Shareholdings 
and Re Lac Minerals. Regardless of the impetus for the Re Neo and Re Pulse Data 
decisions, however, their effects continue to be felt through the uncertainty associ-
ated with poison pill regulation today. 
In Re Lions Gate and Re Bafflinland, the tension between the BCSC and OSC on 
this issue is readily apparent. In Re Baffinland, the OSC refused to defer to the 
business judgment of the target board in deciding whether to cease trade a poison 
pill. In that case, the OSC signalled that it will not hesitate to issue a cease trade 
order, even if the target board fulfils its fiduciary duty by blocking a bid through 
the implementation of a poison pill. The hearing panel in Re Baffinland affirmed 
that the public interest is best served where the target shareholders have the oppor-
tunity to decide whether to tender to the bid. In the securities regulation context, 
the shareholders’ right to choose trumps the directors’ duty under corporate law. 
This assertion is supported by the BCSC in Re Lions Gate. The OSC and BCSC are 
consistent on this issue. 
However, these two commissions disagree as to whether the target board’s 
compliance with its fiduciary duty is relevant to poison pill regulation. In Re Baffin-
land, the OSC opined that whether the target board of directors acted in the best 
interests of the corporation and complied with their fiduciary duty is a “relevant, 
although secondary, consideration for the Commission in deciding whether to 
cease trade a rights plan.”73 There is tension between this position and the BCSC’s 
approach. In Re Lions Gate, the hearing panel commented that, unless a target 
board fails to discharge its fiduciary duty to the corporation, then compliance will 
be a “neutral factor.” The BCSC indicated that they will only be reluctant to inter-
fere with the target board’s decision to implement a poison pill when they are 
seeking an improved or alternative transaction.74 This is consistent with the ap-
proach endorsed by the OSC in Re Lac Minerals.  
Some commentators have taken the opportunity to argue that “the prevailing 
inter-provincial inconsistency in applying National Policy 62-202 to poison pills 
[is] tailor-made as an argument for a national securities regulator.”75 However, in 
2012, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the proposed federal Securities Act, 
which attempted to create a national securities regulator, was ultra vires Parlia-
ment’s general trade and commerce power under subsection 91(2) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867.76 In the wake of this failed attempt to create a national secu-
rities regulator, Canada is left with three of its most active provincial securities 
regulators unable to agree on a coherent analysis under NP 62-202, leaving legal 
advisors to target boards guessing at which approach will apply in a given case.  
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The disjointed approach to poison pill regulation is compounded by the con-
flicting standards for the use of poison pills under corporate law and pursuant to 
securities regulation. Under corporate law, so long as the directors respond to the 
hostile takeover bid in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation, then 
they will meet their fiduciary duty pursuant to paragraph 122(1)(a) of the CBCA. 
The director-centric approach under corporate law is diametrically opposed to the 
shareholder-choice model of securities regulation. To illustrate this point, the fol-
lowing section will articulate the fiduciary duty of a target board in the face of a 
hostile bid under corporate law. 
D. The Corporate Law Approach: Directors’ Fiduciary Duties 
1.  Canada Business Corporations Act 
In contrast to the shareholder-choice model utilized by securities regulators 
through NP 62-202, Canadian courts have adopted a deferential approach to the 
decisions of target boards in the face of a hostile bid.77 For a company incorporated 
under the CBCA, directors are given the broad power to “manage […] the business 
and affairs of the corporation.”78 The powers of the shareholders under the CBCA 
are limited: they have the right to vote at any meeting of the shareholders,79 to re-
ceive any dividend declared by the corporation,80 and to receive any remaining 
property of the company upon dissolution.81 The directors are charged with man-
aging the affairs of the corporation in accordance with their fiduciary duties. The 
CBCA imposes a statutory fiduciary duty on the corporation’s directors to “act 
honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation.”82 So 
long as the directors fulfil this requirement, then pursuant to the business judg-
ment rule, they have wide discretion to manage the corporation.  
The statutory fiduciary duty contained in the CBCA is owed to the corporation 
generally, and not to a particular group of shareholders or stakeholders.83 The 
CBCA provides limited guidance as to the precise content of the directors’ fiduciary 
duty. The common law has not been entirely helpful in fleshing out the content of 
the target board’s fiduciary duty in the context of a hostile takeover bid; however, 
the case law provides some broad guidelines for target boards in the face of a hos-
tile bid. 
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2.  Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: General Common Law Approach  
 (i) BCE and Peoples 
In BCE and Peoples, the Supreme Court of Canada provided the latest articula-
tions of the directors’ fiduciary duty.84 The court commented that the “fiduciary 
duty of the directors to the corporation is a broad, contextual concept. It is not 
confined to short-term profit or share value.”85 The fiduciary duty looks to the 
long-term interests of the corporation and the “content of this duty varies with the 
situation at hand.”86 The court went on to recognize that, in considering the best 
interests of the corporation, the directors may look to the interests of “sharehold-
ers, employees, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their 
decisions.”87 
The Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that the directors’ fiduciary duty is 
“to the corporation, and only to the corporation.”88 Where the interests of the cor-
poration and the various stakeholders of the corporation are in conflict, then the 
directors owe their duty to the corporation.89 The court rejected a line of case law 
coming from the Delaware Supreme Court which holds that the directors’ fiduciary 
duty changes in the context of a takeover bid.90 Instead, the court recognized that 
there is no “fixed rule” for the content of the directors’ fiduciary duty. Even where a 
corporation is on the verge of bankruptcy, as was the case in Peoples, the directors’ 
duty remains to the corporation as a whole and not to the creditors or any other 
stakeholders specifically.91 In this context, the “best interests of the corporation” 
does not mean the “best interests of the creditors,” but rather, it means the “maxi-
mization of the value of the corporation.”92 Although neither BCE nor Peoples 
involved a hostile takeover, these cases seem to suggest the target board’s fiduciary 
duty does not change even in that context: it remains to the corporation and not to 
the shareholders specifically.93  
3.  Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: Takeover Bid Context 
The takeover bid presents a unique challenge to the target board’s fiduciary du-
ty. If the takeover bid is successful, then the target board and management will 
likely be replaced by the new controlling shareholder. Therefore, the target direc-
tors might be motivated to try and defeat the takeover bid for self-interested 
reasons. The use of defensive tactics such as poison pills therefore places target 
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boards in an inherent conflict of interest. In the context of a takeover bid, courts 
have commented that the target board should attempt to minimize this inherent 
conflict of interest by striking a special committee to consider the merits of the bid 
and make an independent recommendation to the board as to how to proceed.94 
A takeover bid will typically offer the shareholders a significant premium over 
the current market price for their shares. However, this short-term benefit to the 
shareholders does not necessarily mean that the bid is in the best interests of the 
corporation.95 Since there are a number of different motivations from the bidder, 
including the break-up of the target, corporate law allows the target board to take 
defensive action to defeat the bid so long as it is in the best interests of the corpora-
tion. For this reason, “it is difficult to formulate general rules to govern the 
behaviour of directors and managers when a bid is made or in anticipation of a 
bid.”96 For instance, in circumstances where the directors have insider knowledge 
that leads them to believe that the value of the corporation is higher than the value 
of the bid, then defensive measures that protect corporate value will be in the best 
interests of the corporation.97 
The Supreme Court of Canada has yet to hear a case specifically involving the 
directors’ fiduciary duty in the face of a hostile takeover bid. Following BCE and 
Peoples, it appears that the nature of the directors’ fiduciary duty does not change 
in the face of a hostile bid. So long as they act in good faith and in the best interests 
of the corporation, then target boards can take defensive action to block an unso-
licited bid. However, the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada has yet to hear a 
takeover bid case leaves open the possibility that a different standard may apply in 
the context of a hostile change of control. 
No other Canadian courts have developed a coherent analytical framework de-
lineating the content of the directors’ fiduciary duty in the context of a hostile 
takeover bid either. There are two competing approaches to the question of who 
should ultimately decide whether the takeover bid is successful: the directors or the 
shareholders. The shareholder-centric approach argues that, once a takeover bid is 
made, any defensive action that interferes with the shareholders’ right to decide 
whether to tender into the bid is impermissible. The competing approach is the 
director-centric model: directors are in the best position to determine whether a 
takeover bid is in the best interests of the corporation. So long as the directors act 
in accordance with their fiduciary duty, then they are permitted to take action to 
block the bid. Although the law is far from settled, it appears as though the direc-
tor-centric approach, which was adopted by the British Columbia Supreme Court 
in Teck, most closely articulates the current Canadian position.98 
 (i) The Director-Centric Approach: Teck  
Teck arose from a battle for the control of a corporation, Afton, that owned an 
undeveloped copper mine near Kamloops, British Columbia. Teck Corp. was the 
largest shareholder of Afton and they sought to gain a majority so that they could 
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enter into an agreement with Afton to bring the mine into production. The direc-
tors of Afton opposed Teck Corp.’s desire to bring the mine into production as 
they had misgivings about Teck Corp.’s reputation, technical capacity and experi-
ence in developing similarly-situated mines.99 The directors wanted to see Afton’s 
principal asset, the copper property, “developed efficiently and profitably.”100 In the 
directors’ opinion, Teck Corp. was not the best company to do this, so they issued a 
large number of shares to a third party, Placer, thereby diluting Teck Corp.’s voting 
power. Afton proceeded to enter into a development agreement with Placer and 
Teck Corp. responded by bringing an action against Afton’s directors for breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
In Teck, the court held that the Afton directors did not violate their fiduciary 
duty to the corporation through the dilutive share issuance since they held a rea-
sonable belief that it was in the best interests of the corporation for Placer to 
develop the mine.101 In arriving at this holding, Berger J. wrestled with the central 
problem of directors’ fiduciary duties in the context of a hostile change of control 
transaction:102 
If the directors have the right to consider the consequences of a takeo-
ver, and to exercise their powers to meet it, if they do so bona fide in the 
interests of the company, how is the court to determine their purpose? 
In every case the directors will insist their whole purpose was to serve 
the company’s interest. And no doubt in most cases it will not be diffi-
cult for the directors to persuade themselves that it is in the company’s 
best interests that they should remain in office. Something more than a 
mere assertion of good faith is required. 
In response to this evidentiary problem, Berger J. formulated the following test 
for determining whether the directors of a target corporation have met their fiduci-
ary duty: first, the directors must act in good faith, and second, where the directors 
believe that a change of control will result in “substantial damage to the company’s 
interests” then there must be reasonable grounds for this belief.103 If there are no 
reasonable grounds, this will justify a finding that the directors were “actuated by 
an improper purpose.”104 In other words, where the target directors do not hold a 
reasonable belief that a substantial threat to the corporation exists, and their sole 
purpose for the dilutive share issuance is to “freeze out” a group of shareholders, 
then their fiduciary duty to the corporation will not be met.105  
The approach in Teck has been followed or cited with approval by many courts 
across Canada, including the Ontario Court of Appeal.106 In Peoples, the Supreme 
Court of Canada cited Teck for the narrow proposition that, in considering wheth-
er the directors are acting in the best interests of the corporation, the board may 
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consider the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders of the corporation.107 
Despite this relatively wide-spread acceptance, at least two cases have attempted to 
derogate from the director-centric rule in Teck in favour of an approach that focus-
es on shareholder choice in the context of a hostile takeover bid. 
 (ii) The Shareholder Choice Approaches: Producers Pipeline and Exco 
A 1987 case from the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Exco,108 and a 1991 case from 
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, Producers Pipelines,109 attempted to formulate 
an approach focused on shareholder choice in the context of a hostile takeover bid. 
Both cases reject Teck and hold that the shareholders should have the right “to de-
cide to whom and at what price they will sell their shares.”110 Ultimately, “defensive 
tactics that result in shareholders being deprived of the ability to respond to a take-
over bid or to a competing bid are unacceptable.”111 
In Producers Pipelines, the court formulated a new test for directors who deploy 
defensive tactics in response to an unsolicited takeover bid. The court held that, 
where the target board implements a poison pill, the directors must be able to es-
tablish: that (1) they had a good faith belief that the bid posed a threat to the 
corporation; (2) they acted after proper investigation; and (3) the defensive 
measures were reasonable in relation to the threat posed.112 Where the target board 
responds to the bid by using a defensive tactic such as a poison pill, the court will 
impose a rebuttable presumption that the directors’ motivations were improper.113 
Similar to the Producers Pipelines’ test, the court in Exco held that the burden 
should rest upon the directors to prove that they were acting in the best interests of 
the corporation.114 If the target directors use their power to issue share capital in 
the face of a hostile bid, then the directors “must be able to show that the consider-
ations upon which the decision to issue was based are consistent only with the best 
interests of the company and inconsistent with any other interests.”115 Thus, Exco 
imposed a more stringent standard upon the target board than Producers Pipelines 
and stands for the proposition that, when faced with a hostile takeover bid, the 
directors of the target corporation should get out of the way and let the sharehold-
ers decide the fate of the bid.  
 (iii) The Rejection of the Shareholder Choice Approach 
Subsequent superior court and appellate court decisions have rejected the 
shareholder-choice approaches endorsed by Producers Pipelines and Exco. In Har-
old E. Ballard, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (General Division) rejected 
Exco and provided some highly critical commentary on the test set forth by the 
Nova Scotia Supreme Court.116 This decision was penned by Farley J., who was the 
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supervising judge of the Commercial List in Toronto at the time and a highly re-
spected corporate law expert.117 Farley J. observed that the Exco test is “unduly 
harsh in that it might inhibit reasonable business decisions,”118 and that instead of a 
reverse onus standard, the real question should be what “the directors had upper-
most in their minds after a reasonable analysis of the situation.”119 So long as the 
target board acts in the best interests of the corporation and in good faith, they will 
fulfill their fiduciary duty in the face of a hostile bid.120 
Producers Pipelines was rejected by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Pente In-
vestment Management. In this case, the court commented that, in the context of a 
hostile takeover bid, the “court must be satisfied that the directors have acted rea-
sonably and fairly.”121 The Ontario Court of Appeal emphasized that directors will 
meet their fiduciary duty to the corporation so long as they make a “reasonable 
decision not a perfect decision,”122 and that the target board will receive the benefit 
of the business judgment rule during a hostile takeover bid so long as “the directors 
have selected from one of several reasonable alternatives.”123 For the court in Pente 
Investment Management, the rationale for shifting the burden of proof to the target 
board did not exist if the directors had successfully minimized their conflict of in-
terest through the implementation of a properly-constituted special committee.124 
4.  Summary of the Current Corporate Law Approach 
Although the Supreme Court of Canada has not heard a case involving the di-
rectors’ fiduciary duty in the face of a hostile takeover bid, the foregoing 
jurisprudence reveals the current position under Canadian corporate law is set out 
in the lower courts: where the target board takes steps to minimize its inherent 
conflict of interest, then the business judgment rule applies in the context of a hos-
tile takeover bid. Reviewing courts will be deferential to the target board’s decision 
to implement a poison pill and block the hostile bid so long as the directors act in 
good faith and have a reasonable basis to believe that the bid represents a threat to 
the corporation. As part of the directors’ discretionary power to manage the corpo-
ration, corporate law recognizes that it is permissible for the target board to “just 
say no” to a hostile bid in circumstances where it is in the corporation’s best inter-
ests. The directors may properly consider the interests of all of the constituent 
stakeholders of the corporation in arriving at their decision. Under corporate law, 
the shareholders will only have the opportunity to tender to the bid where the di-
rectors believe it is in the best interests of the corporation. 
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E.  Proposed National Instrument 62-105: A New Direction in Poison Pill 
Regulation 
1.  Background 
In March 2012, Maureen Jensen, the OSC’s executive director, made remarks to 
the Institute of Corporate Directors on the strategic direction of the OSC.125 Ms. 
Jensen commented on the direction that the OSC plans to take on shareholder de-
mocracy issues, and in particular, poison pills. She noted that, although  
shareholder democracy is a corporate governance issue that has traditionally been 
dealt with under corporate law, “securities regulators have been willing to regulate 
in such matters to further our mandate of investor protection and fostering effi-
cient markets.”126 Ms. Jensen commented that, although poison pills are not 
directly related to shareholder democracy, it is nonetheless an issue that “goes to 
the heart of how decision-making authority is allocated between the board and its 
shareholders.”127 
In Ms. Jensen’s address, she observed that the traditional approach to poison 
pill regulation under NP 62-202 “needs to be revisited in light of the significant 
market, governance and regulatory developments that have occurred since the pol-
icy was adopted in 1986.”128 The Canadian Securities Administrators (the “CSA”) 
subsequently commenced a rule review aimed at “creating a transparent frame-
work for rights plans that allow target boards more latitude in responding to 
hostile bids if shareholder approval of the rights plan has been obtained.”129 Ms. 
Jensen indicated that the decision on how to respond to a hostile bid should be left 
to the target’s board and shareholders, rather than through regulatory hearings on 
an ad hoc basis.130 
2.  Concerns with the Approach under NP 62-202 
In March 2013, the CSA released Proposed National Instrument 62-105 (the 
“Proposed Policy”), which identifies and addresses a number of concerns with the 
current regulatory approach towards poison pills. The CSA notes that “some mar-
ket participants believe that the current Canadian approach generally favours 
bidders rather than targets and their shareholders.”131 Some commentators have 
suggested that securities regulators should revoke NP 62-202 and “stop regulating 
poison pills in any respect.”132 These market participants argue that poison pills 
should be dealt with by the courts as a matter of fiduciary law under the oppression 
remedy contained in corporate legislation.133 In the Proposed Policy, the CSA re-
jects this proposition and notes that “securities regulators have a legitimate role in 
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regulating take-over bids” and to ensure that defensive tactics do not undermine 
the shareholders’ right to respond to a bid.134 
In the Proposed Policy, the CSA recognizes the risk of inconsistent regulatory 
decisions under the current ad hoc approach to poison pill regulation. They admit 
that the “event-driven nature of decision-making” through contested hearings pur-
suant to NP 62-202 creates a “risk of inconsistent and unpredictable decisions” by 
securities regulators.135 For the CSA, this has resulted from “different perspectives 
on underlying principles, such as […] the relevance of the board’s fiduciary duty 
obligations when responding to hostile takeover bids.”136 
Finally, the CSA notes that some commentators have suggested that NP 62-202 
and poison pill regulation in general “inappropriately fetters the discretion of target 
boards to apply their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation in 
a manner consistent with BCE.”137 The commentary accompanying the Proposed 
Policy acknowledges this conflict, but the CSA is of the view that the final decision 
regarding the adoption of a poison pill should remain with the shareholders and 
not with the target board, the regulators, or the courts.138 
3.  Key Features of the Proposed Policy 
The Proposed Policy will establish a regulatory framework for poison pills in all 
CSA jurisdictions.139 Under this new approach, poison pills will be allowed to re-
main in place so long as a simple majority of the shareholders of the target 
corporation approve the rights plan within a specified period of time.140  
The commentary accompanying the Proposed Policy notes that the purpose of 
takeover regulation continues to be the fair treatment of target shareholders.141 In 
contrast to NP 62-202, where the commissions decide whether to cease trade a poi-
son pill on an ad hoc basis, the Proposed Policy will leave the ultimate choice to 
shareholders and, for the most part, takes the decision out of the hands of the pro-
vincial securities commissions.142 Securities regulators do not anticipate 
intervening to cease trade a rights plan that was adopted in compliance with the 
Proposed Policy unless “the target issuer engages in conduct that undermines the 
principles underlying the Proposed Policy or there is a public interest rationale for 
intervention.”143 
The Proposed Policy will allow a poison pill to remain in place indefinitely so 
long as it receives shareholder approval “within 90 days from the date of adoption,” 
or if the poison pill is adopted after the takeover bid has been made, then “within 
90 days from the date the take-over bid was commenced.”144 The poison pill only 
needs ratification from a simple majority of shareholders, and the shareholders 
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may terminate the poison pill at any time by a majority vote.145 The bidder’s shares 
are excluded for both of these votes.146 Finally, the poison pill cannot be used to 
discriminate between takeover bids: if it is “waived or modified with respect to one 
take-over bid it must be waived or modified with respect to any other take-over 
bid.”147  
F.  Will the Proposed Policy Remedy the Uncertainty Surrounding Poison 
Pills? 
It appears as though the Proposed Policy will provide a degree of certainty to 
poison pill regulation since securities commissions will not hear as many applica-
tions for cease trade orders as they do under the existing approach. NP 62-202 
relies upon “active regulatory intervention” on an ad hoc basis to determine wheth-
er a poison pill should be cease-traded.148 Since cease trade orders are made on a 
case-by-case basis, and hearing panel decisions do not have any precedential value, 
this has led to inconsistent and unpredictable decisions regarding poison pills be-
tween the provincial securities regulators, and within the same regulator at 
different times.149 In contrast, under the Proposed Policy, the decision of whether a 
target board should adopt or retain a poison pill is left in the hands of the share-
holders, and securities regulators will only intervene in limited circumstances. The 
possibility for conflicting decisions on poison pills remains under the Proposed 
Policy, but the frequency of those decisions should be drastically reduced.  
The Proposed Policy represents an effort to have target boards self-regulate the 
use of poison pills, and in the process, it takes the opportunity away from the re-
spective provincial commissions to apply (or not apply, as the case may be) a 
corporate law-inspired fiduciary duty analysis. The Proposed Policy is a positive 
development for securities regulation and market participants since it provides a 
set of black and white rules delineating when a poison pill is permissible and when 
it is not. So long as the target board complies with the requirements of the Pro-
posed Policy, it will not attract regulatory scrutiny. The Proposed Policy clarifies 
the securities regulators’ position that the business judgment rule and the directors’ 
fiduciary duty are irrelevant considerations in the context of poison pill regulation. 
Further, it reaffirms the CSA’s clear preference for shareholder choice in the face of 
a hostile takeover bid. 
G.  Will the Proposed Policy Remedy the Conflict Between Securities  
Regulation and Corporate Law? 
Although the Proposed Policy will decrease the opportunity for uncertain re-
sults within the securities regulation context, it will not remedy the conflict 
between securities regulation and corporate law. The regulation of poison pills in 
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the face of a hostile takeover bid will continue to be inconsistent with the approach 
set forth by the Supreme Court of Canada in BCE and Peoples. The directors’ fidu-
ciary duty is to the corporation, yet the Proposed Policy requires the target board 
to shift its duty to the consideration of shareholder interests in the context of a hos-
tile takeover bid. The result is that Canadian directors will continue to be pulled in 
two different directions when faced with a hostile takeover bid. 
The Proposed Policy gives target boards greater flexibility in determining 
whether to adopt and maintain a poison pill in the face of a hostile takeover bid as 
it allows the target board to completely block an unsolicited bid where it is not in 
the best interests of the corporation, provided the shareholders agree. In compari-
son to NP 62-202, the Proposed Policy gives the directors more range to respond to 
bids that are not in the best interests of the corporation. However, in comparison 
to the scope of directors’ power under the CBCA, the latitude that a target board 
will have in responding to an unsolicited bid is significantly circumscribed under 
the Proposed Policy. In the commentary accompanying the Proposed Policy, the 
CSA adheres to the view that “the ultimate decision about the adoption or mainte-
nance of a Rights Plan should remain with the shareholders and not with the board 
of directors, regulators or courts.”150 This is in direct conflict with the limited rights 
of shareholders under the CBCA. 
Given that poison pill regulation requires the fiduciary duty of the target board 
to shift from the corporation to the shareholders in the context of a hostile takeover 
bid, the theoretical underpinnings of the Proposed Policy closely align with the 
widely-rejected Producers Pipelines standard. The Proposed Policy supports the 
notion from Producers Pipelines that defensive action in the face of a bid must in-
terfere with shareholder choice as little as possible.151 Further, both provide that 
any defensive action taken in response to the bid should be put to the shareholders 
for prior or subsequent approval. This shareholder-choice model of corporate gov-
ernance was rejected by Farley J. in Harold E. Ballard and by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in Pente Investment Management.152  
The decision to promote shareholders rights over and above the interests and 
rights of the other stakeholders of the corporation also directly conflicts with the 
approach set forth by the Supreme Court of Canada in BCE and Peoples. First, cor-
porate law is clear that directors, acting in the best interests of the corporation, 
have a fiduciary duty to protect, and attempt to maximize, corporate value.153 
However, the Proposed Policy imposes an obligation on the target board to max-
imize shareholder choice in the face of a bid. This is not a problem when the bid 
will maximize both corporate and shareholder value. However, maximization of 
corporate and shareholder value may often be in conflict since, as BCE articulates, 
the directors’ fiduciary duty is “not confined to short-term profit or share value.”154 
Shareholder value in the face of a bid is necessarily short-term: if the shareholders 
do not have the opportunity to tender to the bid, then it will eventually expire and 
the takeover premium will evaporate.  
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As opposed to the short-term focus of the shareholder-choice model, the long-
term interests of a corporation involve a wider set of considerations. The decision 
to promote shareholder-choice over other stakeholder interests in the corporation 
in the Proposed Policy is problematic from a corporate law perspective. BCE is 
clear that “in considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors 
may look to the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, consum-
ers, governments and the environment to inform their decision.”155 Where 
directors give appropriate attention to the “ancillary interests” of the corporation, 
courts will apply a deferential approach to the resulting decisions of the directors in 
accordance with the business judgment rule.156 However, the Proposed Policy takes 
away this flexibility and deference in the context of a hostile takeover bid. It shifts 
the directors’ fiduciary duty away from the corporation as an aggregate entity, and 
moves it to a single group within the corporation: the shareholders.  
Under the current corporate law approach for directors faced with a hostile bid, 
the target board is required to act in good faith and in the best interests of the cor-
poration.157 If so, then the directors are not required to get shareholder approval for 
the implementation of a poison pill and the target board can unilaterally “just say 
no” to the unsolicited bid.158 In the commentary accompanying the Proposed Poli-
cy, the CSA notes that one of the alternatives to NP 62-202 is to leave “decisions as 
to defensive tactics completely to the courts as a matter of fiduciary duty law.”159 
The CSA concluded that the Proposed Rule is preferable since “the purpose of 
take-over bid regulation is to ensure fair treatment of target shareholders and that 
all market participants know what rules apply.”160 It appears as though the Pro-
posed Policy will accomplish this, but it will be done at the expense of directors’ 
power to manage the corporation under corporate law. 
H. Conclusion 
During one of the most memorable scenes in Wall Street, Gordon Gekko 
speaks at the annual general meeting of a fictional company called Teldar Paper. 
Although the film does not make it explicit, Gekko appears to be involved in a 
proxy battle, and he tells the shareholders that “you own the company. That’s right, 
you, the stockholder.” He claims that, as a corporate raider and the largest single 
shareholder of Teldar, he is “not a destroyer of companies [rather, he is] a liberator 
of them.” What Gekko does not tell the Teldar shareholders is that he is self-
interested in short-term profits and he wants to elect a board of directors that will 
maximize the immediate value of the corporation so that he can realise a quick 
return on his investment. Gekko is not concerned with the long-term health of the 
corporation, nor is he concerned with the panoply of constituent stakeholders that 
                                                                                                                                                         
155 BCE, supra note 4 at para 40. 
156 Ibid. 
157 CBCA, supra note 26, s 122(1)(a). 
158 Teck, supra note 24 at para 101. 
159 Proposed Policy, supra note 7 at 2655. 
160 Ibid at 2649. 
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make up the modern corporation. None of this matters to the indomitable Gekko, 
since “greed, for lack of a better word, is good.” 
Through the CBCA and the two most recent Supreme Court of Canada deci-
sions on the fiduciary duties of corporate directors, Canadian corporate law has 
exhibited a preference for the director-centric approach in the context of a hostile 
takeover bid.161 However, the poison pill regulatory framework has staked an oppo-
site position in the battlefield for corporate control. This is problematic since, as 
Gekko demonstrates, shareholders do not owe a duty to the corporation to act in 
its best interests. NP 62-202 and the Proposed Policy ignore the fact that the corpo-
ration is a dynamic entity with diverse stakeholder interests, and quite often, the 
target is in a vulnerable position during the course of a hostile takeover bid. For 
regulators, in the context of an unsolicited bid, the shareholders’ right to choose is 
paramount. This strips the directors of much of their statutory discretionary power 
to manage the corporation, and as a result, the long-term interests of stakeholders 
and the corporation as a whole will be undermined going forward. 
If the Proposed Policy is adopted by the provincial securities regulators, the way 
that target boards respond to hostile bids will change significantly. The poison pill 
will only have utility for target boards in circumstances where it is clear that a ma-
jority of the shareholders will ratify it. In situations where the directors believe that 
the bid is not in the best interests of the corporation, but shareholder support for 
the poison pill is unclear, target boards might be reluctant to employ this defensive 
tactic. After all, a shareholder vote against the poison pill is essentially a vote in 
favour of the hostile bid. Despite the reduced effectiveness of the poison pill, the 
fiduciary duty will still require the directors to take affirmative steps to resist the 
bid in certain circumstances. Therefore, it is conceivable that directors and their 
legal counsel will be forced to get creative and develop new defensive tactics that 
will allow target corporations to block hostile bids. 
Since all Canadian corporations that raise public capital will be subject to poi-
son pill regulations, it appears as though the securities regulators will continue to 
pick winners and losers in the market for corporate control. Whether this is done 
through NP 62-202 or the Proposed Policy, one thing is clear: for better or worse, 
shareholder empowerment is alive and well in Canadian corporations. 
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